ABSTRACT I first distinguish issues about rules and issues about language in Wittgenstein. I then I distinguish private and private rules and argue that there can be private rules because norms of reasoning are private rules. I suggest that Wittgenstein may have equated rules with public rules. I end with reflections on private language.
Negative conclusions about private language are widely supposed to derive from Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following and the impossibility of following a rule privately. I argue that this is incorrect as an interpretation as well as being implausible on independent grounds.
Language and Rules
In §202, Wittgenstein clearly says that it is not possible to follow a rule privately (Wittgenstein 1953 ; all Wittgenstein references will be to this work). Does this not commit him to thinking, as the standard interpretation has it, that private language is impossible?
(Saul Kripke thought so in his 1982.) Many commentators say that the 'real private language argument' occurs in section §202, not later. So it is all over for private language in §202. But this is only so given the assumption of a strong connection between language and rules. This we should examine.
Does language always involve rules? What does Wittgenstein think is the connection
between language and rules? My view is that neither is obvious. If language does always involve rules, it quickly yields an anti-private language view, as follows:
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We cannot follow rules privately.
Language is constituted by rules.
We cannot privately follow the rules that constitute a private language.
So language cannot be private.
But a premise here is that we understand language by following rules. And this is not obvious.
Of course in some minimal sense Noam Chomsky has shown that there are grammatical rules that we all follow in understanding language (Chomsky 1966) . But these general grammatical rules falls far short of what words mean (for example that 'dog' means dogs). So the necessity for Chomskyan grammatical rules that are common between very different languages does not mean that following such grammatical rules could constitute understanding the meanings of words.
Rules, Public and Private
What is a rule? What does Wittgenstein means by a "rule", or by "Regel" in German? A rule, at its most basic, is at least a two-term conditional relation. The antecedent is a fact, the consequent is either a prescription, or an act with a deontic property (Boghossian 2012): it says "If X then do Y"; or "If X then you ought to do Y". Or the consequent could be a negative prescription or negative deontic fact.
What is 'privacy'? The issues over private languages, private mental states and private rules seem all to be distinct. I shall return to make various distinctions in the next section, but for now I want to characterize a minimal sense of 'privacy' as characterizing mental phenomena that have no observable ('outer') causes or effects by which another person may know them.
How then does Wittgenstein get to his negative conclusion in §202 about the impossibility of following a rule privately?
Let us put language to one side for a while and just focus on rules: why should we agree with Wittgenstein that rules cannot be obeyed privately. It is a private rule, and such a rule is to be obeyed privately. Contra §202, thinking I have followed such a rule is not at all the same thing as actually following the rule. These are And in reasoning we respect these norms. Furthermore, many people think that understanding logical constants is constituted by following the introduction and elimination rules that characterize the constants (Wittgenstein 1932 -33, section 2, Genzen 1935 , Strawson 1952 , p. 56, Kneale 1956 , Hacking 1979 . But the norms of rationality or logic are private rules, which we typically follow privately. Obeying such a rule is a private mental act of forming beliefs or intentions. These rules are not interpersonal rules, and they can be, and often they are, obeyed privately. I suppose they could in principle be obeyed with some outer behavioural manifestation such that another person could know the mental act expected by perceiving the outer behavior of the person following the rules. Perhaps some people's eyebrow twitches when they perform modus ponens and their nose twitches when they perform disjunctive syllogism. But in many cases, most cases, there is no outer perceivable manifestation of the rule-following that constitutes rationality or logical reasoning.
Since there is reasoning, there had better be such private rulesnot just possibly but actually. And we had better actually follow them at least for much of the time. Someone might replycontrary to Descartes and Kantthat there are norms of rationality, but not rules. However, even if the norms of rationality are not rules, surely we can upgrade them into rules, as Descartes did, and as do many decision theorists and Baysean epistemologists. Then these norms can become private rules, even though the principles themselves are merely norms for most of us. Having upgraded, it is possible to obey these rules privately. I can just reason well or badly, according to the internalized rules, without making a public song and dance about it. Of course, when I come to act on such reasoning, in the sense of making bodily movements not merely mental acts, then others can come to a justified view about my reasoning processes. But we might or might not make bodily movements as a result of reasoning. That is, having recognized the norms, we may articulate them in rules, which are private rules, followed privately. Why not?
'Rules' and 'Privacy'
Or is there a stronger sense of 'privacy' in which rules of rationality or logic are not 'private' in that stronger sense? Let us look more closely at what 'privacy' might mean in the context of rule-following. In the case of private language, there is a strong epistemological notion of privacy in play according to which another person cannot, in principle, understand a private language.
However, in the case of private language too, the modal definition cannot be fundamental. It must hold in virtue of the nature of the states in question. It is not possible to know the language because it is about private states. The emphasis placed on possibility in discussions of private language is puzzling. Possibilities are usually not interesting in philosophy apart from what they tell us about actuality. But this has not been heeded in discussions of private language, where the possibility takes centre stage. We need to ask: in virtue of what would it not be possible for another to understand a private language? I propose, we answer: in virtue of a) being about a felt state with no standard observable causes, behavioural effects or manifestation; b) there is no actual language for those states is in place; and c) the introduced meanings are fixed to the felt state introspectively. These are why it is not possible for another to grasp the meaning.
What is the analogue of privacy for mental states and private language for rulefollowing? Perhaps this: rule-following that is private has no causes, or behavioural effects or manifestation by which another person can know whether or not the rule has been followed. What would be the weak/strong distinction here? A strong sense of 'privacy' would be that another person could not in principle know whether or not the rule has been followed, and the rule cannot even be explained to others. Moreover, it would be in virtue of what it is to follow a private rule that another person cannot know in principle whether the rule has been followed or even understand it?
Let us now recall the distinction between private and public rules? The idea of following a public rule inwardly, and independent of observable manifestations does disappear, since the rule dictates observable actions. What on earth could be a private act of following a public rule? So public rules cannot even be weakly private.
But what of private rules? When we follow either trivial private rules or rules of reasoning or logic, obedience is a mental act that may or may not have a public observable manifestation. So private rule-following is not impossible, unlike public rule-following.
Private rules may be weakly private. Private rules may be followed privately and no one else may know. But what of the strong sense of privacy, where it is impossible to know if the rule has been followed, and we cannot even explain the rule to others? Surely we can know whether others have reasoned well and logically, and we can explain the rules of rationality and logic to others. So in that sense, these rules are not strongly private. The idea that such rules are unintelligible to anyone else is unintelligible. So private rules are weakly but not strongly private.
Public Rules
Is there any reason to think that a strong and not a weak notion of 'privacy' is in question in §202 (unlike §258)? In the last section, we found it hard to believe that a strong sense of privacy is in question when Wittgenstein denies that we cannot obey a rule privately.
So suppose that Wittgenstein is saying that we cannot follow a rule, any rule, privately, in a weak sense. But as we also saw, that seems like an implausible claim since it runs up against the existence of trivial mental rules and rules of reasoning and logic.
The only hypothesis I can think of is that by "rules", or " Regelen", Wittgenstein just But this is strange. Consider orders. I can also obey the order: think of a number between one and ten. That order must be obeyed privately. What goes for orders goes for rules. There are public rules and private rules, just as there are public and private orders. And following and obedience should be public in one case and private in the other.
We can argue as follows. If something can be ordered, it can be made into a rule. I can be ordered to think thoughts or imagine things with no behavioural expression. Therefore there can be private rules. A real example: people in religious orders are ordered not to think lustful thoughts. Such rules are private rules, and obedience to them is private. Obedience is inner obedience. God sees: no one else does.
But if 'rules', for Wittgenstein, are by definition public rules, as on my hypothesis, then it would mean that not all norms correspond to rules. A rule is more than an ought. And while all rules are normative, in a very general sense, not all norms are rules. Hence, it could be, given what rules are, that rules are necessarily public rules, and following a rule depends on a public practice or custom, which is publically observable, as Wittgenstein says at §202. That makes some sense of the fact that we can raise the puzzling issue of whether a public rule could be obeyed only once or whether there must be a wider social practice with regular obedience ( §199 and §200). Such a practice or institutional theory of public rules seems (Englemann 2011 (Englemann , 2013 . Nevertheless, when a new language is introduced, self-consciously, as opposed to culturally evolving, it needs to be set up by means of an explicit rule. A private language is such an introduced language (see §258). So corresponding to a private language, there are rules, since the introduced language is set up by rules concerning inner ostensive definition. These rules may be private rules, not quite in the sense in which there are rules of rationality, but in the sense of linking a sensation type with the deployment of a linguistic physical type (a word). Where both antecedent and consequent of the rule are public, a rule is public. Where both antecedent and consequent are private, the rule is private. Where one is public and the other is private, I shall say that the rule is a 'hybrid' rule. Where one of the two items connected in the rule is a symbola sound or markwhich is to be deployed in some way given a mental state that one has, it is a hybrid rule, since it connects something private with something publicthe perceivable symbol. By contrast, purely private rules connect two private items. Private language rules are hybrid rules. Most linguistic rules are public since the word (as physical token) is one public thing and the reality that corresponds to that public thing is another public thing, property or fact.
There is no reason to think that there cannot be hybrid rules when one of the items in the rule Wittgenstein's public senseinstead it is a mini intra-personal institution or linguistic habit, which can be stable enough, given a reliable memory, to set up meaningful private language, one in which a terms refers to private mental states or events. But this language is useless in the sense that it cannot be used for interpersonal communication. (Wittgenstein distinguishes use from meaning at §43.) The introduced private language is useless but it is not meaningless 2 .
